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On or about December 1910, human character changed.
- Virginia Woolf1

In 1955, Louis Hartz proposed that liberalism has always dominated American
political thought.2 This seemed like a rather uncontroversial thesis. Historians and
political theorists of all different stripes have criticized him ever since. Perhaps the
persistence and the ardor of the criticism betray that there is, at least, a grain of truth in
Hartz’s thesis. But that truth is somewhat elusive as, regardless of where one falls in this
debate, the meaning of liberalism has not remained constant throughout American
history.3 The twenty-first century inherits a liberalism that is altered from Locke’s
vision, a liberalism that is fundamentally different from that of early American
politicians, or the abolitionists or the labor movement of the late nineteenth century. One
way in which liberalism has changed over the last century is that the notion of the
individual that it seeks to protect is different from its nineteenth-century counterpart.
This essay gives a brief overview of this shift and explores some of the implications for
contemporary constitutional debates.
In the nineteenth century, at least as far as the law was concerned, the world was
populated by distinct, rational, and self-reliant individuals, each seeking to unravel the
meaning of a more or less discernible universe. Principles of property, consent, and self-
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ownership defined freedom and fueled both the market and the polity. In Locke’s view,
men were inherently capable of thinking and acting in their own interest. Reason and
self-interest were inextricable aspects of human nature. In a just political system,
obligation was created through acts of free will rather than through relationships of
subjugation and authority. 4 In addition, Locke assumed that every man had a natural
right to his own labor and an equally inviolable right to property once he had mixed his
labor with the land.5 Built on these premises, Adam Smith argued that value was
determined by the labor that went into an object rather than demand or marginal utility.
It was the role of the political system to protect freedom, defined as the right to one’s
own labor and the right to act on one’s own behalf. It followed that the state should not
interfere with property or with contract except in rare moments when it was absolutely
necessary to protect the public.6
Courts had a special role in this political economy. They policed the boundary
between the private and the public. The private realm was, in theory, an arena free from
coercion, one in which individuals acted voluntarily, entering into agreements that
produced a particular distribution of the nation’s wealth, which was just precisely
because it was a product of these acts of free will. Thus, private law could protect
freedom by making sure that relations between individuals properly reflected their
intentions. Similarly, courts would ensure that the public realm was neutral as to the
distribution of goods, by limiting government action. Courts would prevent factions from
creeping into the polity and seizing the state apparatus for their own good just as courts
ensured that the state interfered as seldom as possible in the private realm of the market.7
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As the nineteenth century drew to a close, this view of the world began to selfdestruct. The economy, which had thrived so well under this classical model, began to
expose the myths that lay beneath the liberal ideology. As the industrial economy
matured, corporations grew. Labor disputes became more intense threatening the myth of
American exceptionalism.8 It became increasingly strained to view individual acts in the
market as the product of free will. Thus, progressive legal thinkers observed a reality that
had become almost impossible to ignore: there was no such thing as a private realm free
from coercion. As the political and economic world became more centralized after the
Civil War, the concept of a rational and disembodied self determining its own fate by
contracting in a neutral market grew increasingly anachronistic. Impersonal forces and
great conglomerations of power seemed much more responsible for the way things were
than individual acts of volition.9
As the explanatory value of the will theory and contract ebbed, judges began to
develop new legal doctrines, and reformers like Roscoe Pound, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
and Louis D. Brandeis began to articulate new theories of the law. In doing so, they
cobbled together a new sort of freedom, based on the individual’s right to control
information and define the contours of his or her own personality. As they grew to
accept the government’s role in distributing wealth, courts seized on this right to selfdefinition to trace new limits on state power. The imagined boundary no longer insulated
property or contract, but rather personality. Of course, contract and property did not
disappear but they lost their preeminence. Throughout the twentieth century and in areas
of law such as tort law, First Amendment law, and criminal law, free will and freedom of
contract persisted in an uneasy tension with the right to metamorphose, to reinvent
8
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oneself by controlling public and private information. In other words, the law gradually
recognized that individual freedom was expressed not only in agreements in the market
but also in the choice to be whoever one wanted to be and live however one chose to live.
Thus, in the new liberal order, the market and polity comprised the public and the internal
life of the individual and family grew to represent the private realm.10
The story of how classical legal theory faltered is a familiar one.11 This essay
focuses on one piece of that story. Influenced by the growing popularity of naturalism,
positivism, and Darwinism, progressive critics of laissez-faire economics and classical
legal thought recognized the organic unity of subject and object, the individual mind and
the body politic. They saw the human being in context, a product of his environment
rather than its author. Individuals act in relation to each other, never in isolation.12
Eventually, the law grew to recognize that the particulars of a person’s position in
society, his or her social, ethnic, or racial group determined, at least in part, his or her
share of the nation’s wealth and power. Recognizing that the accidents of birth
determined an individual’s chances posed certain unique problems for a liberal ideology
based on the preservation of human liberty. What, then, were the purpose of the courts
and the limits of state power?
The law gradually recognized the importance of social group, and the nineteenth
century shift that Sir Henry Maine so famously termed “the movement from Status to
Contract”13 moved back. The twentieth-century legal emphasis on status, however, was
quite different from its eighteenth-century analog. Status was no longer authoritatively
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allocated or enforced by law. Suited to the modern world, status or identity grew to
represent a constantly shifting state; while at times a product of environment and biology,
personality was also determined by the creative mind. At the turn of the century,
progressive legal reformers, like their counterparts in the social sciences, recognized that
the realm of freedom was smaller than they once thought, but they did not forsake the
ideal entirely. Instead, freedom in its attenuated form took on new meaning; it became
the right to control the ebb and flow of information about oneself. In essence the modern
legal status of the individual embodied a state of perpetual self-invention. To be free, in
other words, an individual (or family or group) must be able to determine who she is and
how she will lead her life.
As courts gradually redefined individual freedom, the liberal ideology
reconstituted itself in the face of a massive theoretical and practical assault. It
transformed just as the progressive critique and the reality of the modern industrial world
threatened the basic premises of the liberal state. Thus, courts would police a new
boundary between private and public, society and politics. Recognizing the need for
government intervention in the economy, the law grew to protect a new kind freedom,
one defined primarily by the individual ability to define oneself. It preserved a newly
configured private realm and with it the liberal state.
In constitutional law, this shift from property and contract to personality took
most obvious form in the doctrine of substantive due process.14 The right to privacy was
not explicitly identified until 1965 when the Supreme Court decided Griswold v.
Connecticut,15 but the Court began to develop the notion that a person’s right to his own
identity presented a constitutional limit to state police power decades before. In the
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1920s, for instance, the Court began to carve out a constitutional right to privacy by
striking down two statutes that undermined parents’ rights to bring up their children.
Amidst the red scare that followed World War I, states began passing statutes that
reflected mounting xenophobia. In Meyer v. Nebraska,16 the Court held that a state law
that forbade the teaching of any modern language other than English to children violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,17 the Court struck
down a statute compelling enrollment in public schools.
In a certain way, both of these cases were run-of-the-mill Lochner era cases,
striking down state regulation under a broad conception of the due process clause. Yet,
they also stood apart, by recognizing a new sort of freedom: The Court in Meyer
emphasized “the fact that the spirit of America is liberty and toleration – the disposition
to allow each person to live his own life in his own way, unhampered by unreasonable
and arbitrary restrictions.”18 The Court elaborated:
it is not just a freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right to engage in
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home, and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.19
The language was familiar20 but the emphasis different from the typical Lochner era
cases. The Court noted that freedom to choose exists not only in the market but also in
the internal life of the individual and the family.
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Thus, by the time West Coast Hotel and the Carolene Products footnote declared
the death of the long suffering classical model, the law had already sown the seeds of a
new self and a new liberal state.21 So, in a way, the footnote was a pronouncement of the
future of a radically altered liberal state. The courts in the new liberal view would ensure
that the state did not interfere with the individual’s right to define him or herself and
would simultaneously prevent the public realm from becoming overrun by faction. But
faction was no longer just a conglomeration of economic interests but rather a group with
a particular set of values. The public realm would remain neutral but neutrality no longer
meant neutral as to the distribution of goods. Instead, it meant that the state would not
adopt one set of values to the exclusion of another or embrace one racial or ethnic group
at the expense of another. The rule of law would ensure that there was room for everyone
with every set of conflicting or overlapping values to coexist. This is the twentiethcentury notion of liberalism.
This right to self-definition was elaborated by the Warren Court in countless
contexts. In 1937, the Supreme Court redefined due process of law to include the
provisions of the Bill of Rights that were “of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty.”22 The Warren Court expanded this doctrine to redefine the nature of rights,
freedom, and citizenship.23 Thus, the right to self-definition translated into a right to
privacy in the context of search and seizure law,24 a right to choose to have a child (or
not),25 the freedom to marry a person of another race,26 a broad right to express oneself in
speech,27 and an expanded right to associate.28
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It is now commonly understood that we are experiencing a backlash against the
Warren Court.29 And the backlash parallels the criticism leveled by the progressives in
the wake of Lochner – only the political commitments of the critics have changed.30 The
critics of classical liberalism were motivated by a dedication to social justice. In pursuit
of this goal, progressives, among other things, exposed the mythical nature of the
distinction between a private and a public realm. It was the progressives who pointed out
that you cannot take an individual out of context, that every individual’s actions affect
one another, and that by restricting government intrusions into the private realm, the
government does not remain neutral but rather supports a very particular distribution of
wealth and power. In the current constitutional climate, things have reversed. It is
conservatives – judges, advocates, and academics – who are attempting to reveal this
fundamental flaw in the liberal worldview. It is conservatives who are seeking to expose
that neutrality as to values is impossible; by acting, or failing to act, the government
inevitably takes a position on values.
This argument was at the heart of Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence
v. Texas,31 in which the Court held that a statute criminalizing same sex sodomy violated
the right to privacy. Such a ruling is a classic liberal holding in the twentieth-century
sense. It protects the right of individuals who wish to engage in particular sorts of sexual
conduct to do so. With echoes of progressive critics of Lochner era decisions, Scalia
argued that all sorts of legislation affect morals, both the morals of those affected by the
laws as well as those who sought to enact them: laws concerning “bigamy, same-sex
marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
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obscenity.”32 Justice Scalia offered a list that juxtaposed laws regulating conduct where
there is moral consensus (like bigamy) with those that are highly contested (like same-sex
marriage). In essence, Scalia insisted that in the name of forcing the government to stay
out of people’s private lives, the Court is not maintaining neutrality as to morals, but is,
in reality, favoring one set of morals over another. The parallel with Lochner did not
remain implicit: Scalia explained that the statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy
imposes constraints on liberty: “So do laws prohibiting prostitution, recreational use of
heroin, and, for that matter, working more than 60 hours a week in a bakery.”33 Scalia
offered a critique of the structure of liberalism, one that could apply equally to both the
laissez-faire liberalism of the Lochner Court and its twentieth-century successor.
In Washington v. Glucksburg,34 Chief Justice Rehnquist made a similar argument
about the effort to expand substantive due process to include a right to terminate one’s
life. He described the history of substantive due process, explaining the emergence of
economic due process and the persistence of the right under the Fourteenth Amendment
in cases like Meyer, Pierce and Griswold. He concluded that the history admonishes that
the search should not be for “extratextual absolutes,” but rather “scrutiny of a legislative
resolution (perhaps unconscious) of clashing principles, each quite possibly worthy in
and of itself, but each to be weighed within the history of our values as a people.”35 In
other words, there are different and conflicting views of morality. The Court should not
upset the legislative decision to favor one over another, unless, perhaps, the legislature
strays too far from tradition. Using the progressive critique of Lochner era judicial
activism, the Court exposed the central flaw in the liberal distinction between a private
and a public realm. The government cannot stay out of the private realm; by deciding not
to act the government necessarily favors one set of values over another. In the wake of
32
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the realist critique of Lochner, Rehnquist argued, all we can do is look to reality – moral
consensus in tradition – to discern a limit on government power.
In the abortion cases, the Court’s perennial dissenters similarly argue that the
effort to stay out of people’s intimate lives is merely a pretense for favoring one set of
values over another. Curiously, the legacy of Lochner has been claimed by both those
justices who embrace the “liberal” approach to substantive due process, and those who
oppose it. In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun cited Holmes’ dissent in Lochner to support
the modern notion of liberalism, quoting the following passage: “‘(The Constitution) is
made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain
opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States.’”36 Of course, Holmes; statement was not an attempt to
institute this modern, liberal notion of value-neutrality, but rather to debunk the
nineteenth-century version of liberalism, which was supported a particular economic
theory. Then-Justice Rehnquist’s opinion hewed closer to the type of criticism that fell
the Lochner era. Just as legal realists criticized Lochner and its progeny on the basis that
there is no inherent distinction between the public and private realm and that all actions
and choices affect one another, so too Rehnquist argued that laws aimed at value
neutrality are not neutral at all. Under the guise of keeping the government out of
people’s private lives, the Court simply inserted itself into the legislative process,
favoring one set of values over another.37 In a way, both Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist are heirs to Holmes’ dissent. Taken a bit out of context, Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer (the “liberal” justices) have, indeed, adopted Holmes’ view
that the Constitution tolerates differing views. Roe v. Wade announces that it is
protecting that principle by requiring the government to remain neutral with regard to
36
37

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973).
Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).

Roiphe 9/8/2006 p. 11

values. By doing so, ironically, Justice Blackmun reaffirmed the mythical divide
between the private and the public, the individual and the community that sustained the
Lochner era Court.
This rhetoric is not limited to substantive due process. In the context of the Free
Exercise Clause, a conservative majority observed that the right of the individual to
conduct his life as he chooses cannot be viewed in isolation. The right of the individual
to live his own life according to his own values inevitably interferes,, and can eclipse the
right of the group to define its identity as it chooses. In Goldman v. Weinberger, for
instance, the Court held that the Air Force could apply its regulation concerning dress
codes to prohibit an officer from wearing a yarmulke.38 In upholding the application of
the regulation, Justice Rehnquist noted that the military had a strong interest in fostering
“instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.”39 In other words, the
value of the group in collective self-definition, at least in some instances, outweighs that
of the individual.
Extending this holding to non-military contexts, the Court in Employment
Division v. Smith,40 held that a state can enforce a law of universal application regardless
of its effect on religious practice. A law of general application can be enforced even if
the person it affects engages in the proscribed act for religious purposes. Thus, the Court
held that an Oregon statute criminalizing the use of drugs could apply to someone who
smoked peyote as part of a religious ritual.41 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
explained that allowing an exception for religious practice would simply create “a private
right to ignore generally applicable laws,” something which he considered a
“constitutional anomaly.”42 How could one justice’s notion of freedom be another’s
“constitutional anomaly”? The answer lies in two different attitudes toward the
38
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twentieth-century liberal ideal. The dissent subscribes to the notion that the government
should stay out of people’s private lives, allowing each to develop his or her own
personality, while the majority rejects this version of liberalism, pointing out that the
logic is inherently flawed. It is the community’s collective right to define the contours of
acceptable behavior. Under the guise of forcing the government to remain neutral, the
Court is, in fact, favoring one set of values over another.
*

*

*

In the wake of Lochner, the law has redefined individual freedom and privacy:
freedom to contract in the market has changed to a freedom to live by one’s own values
and define oneself as one pleases. But the structure of liberal ideology has remained
intact: to protect individual freedom and avoid the corrosive effect of faction, the state
must refrain from interfering with the sanctity of the private realm. As a result, the
structure of much of the Court’s jurisprudence – exemplified by substantive due process
and free exercise but also seen in equal protection and free speech – has continued to
focus on restricting government intrusion on the private realm. The Lochner-era justices
believed that they were upholding the rights of the minority against the majority. By
policing freedom, defined as a right to contract, the Court would prevent the irrational
intrusion of majority rule on minority rights. The current substantive due process cases
follow this same model but substitute freedom of self-definition for freedom of contract.
In upholding the distinction between a private and a public realm, the Court will always
be vulnerable to the realist critique that the private and the public divide exists in rhetoric
not reality, that individual choices always affect one other, and that the community
defines the individual just as the individual defines the community. The realist critique,
ironically, has now shifted from the left to the right.
The contemporary liberal view, like the nineteenth-century predecessor, is
vulnerable to the same structural critique as laissez-faire liberalism, and perhaps, it will
suffer the same historical fate. By forcing the government to stay out of the market,
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nineteenth-century courts facilitated economic growth. As the gap between the wealthy
and the poor and corporations and the individual grew, however, it became increasingly
difficult to sustain the liberal view of the public-private divide. The government no
longer seemed neutral as to the distribution of wealth and power and the market no longer
seemed free from coercion. Similarly, the new liberal state has helped foster a great array
of values and world views. But, that same diversity threatens to expose the artificial
nature of a distinction between the public and the private world. Thus, as conservatives
point out, the government is never neutral as to values and the private world of the
individual and the family cannot be seen in isolation: each individual choice affects the
community and each other.
Where are we, then, at the turn-of-the-twenty-first century? The future of the new
liberal order depends, in part, on whether the newly constituted Court, as a general
matter, exalts value-neutrality over the power of the majority to define the morality of the
community. It depends on whether the Court is invested in contemporary liberalism
enough to overlook the same flaws that plagued reformers at the turn of the last century.
Given that the conservative justices on the Rehnquist Court were gradually exposing the
myth of value neutrality as, in reality, favoring one set of values over another, it seems
likely that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will carry that torch. The conservative
justices accept that the government cannot intrude on personal decisions when the value
at issue is deeply rooted in tradition. So, the Rehnquist Court seemed willing to police
the boundary between private and public, favoring value-neutrality but only when there is
a basic consensus as to the underlying value. But of course question is where, and how,
that line is drawn. In other words, it seems unlikely that the Roberts Court would
overrule Griswold but the abortion and sodomy cases are less secure.
This is not the only open question. After the collapse of Lochner, from the New
Deal through the 1970s, academics debated the extent to which the Court might require,

Roiphe 9/8/2006 p. 14

or permit, the government to take certain active steps to ensure economic equality.43 A
similar shadow debate is occurring now. To what extent will the Court permit the
government to support certain groups or values in order to ensure that they are
represented adequately in the public. Thus, in the name of neutrality, maybe the Court
will allow the government to depart from formal neutrality to single out certain groups
for preferential treatment. Thus, it seems, in recent affirmative action cases, that in the
name of “diversity,” the state may be allowed to single out minorities for preferential
treatment.44 In other words, the government can favor a certain group but only if it does
so for the ultimate good that everybody’s individual and group identity is represented in
the public. Similarly, in the Establishment Clause context, perhaps it is okay to fund
religion as long as each religion (at least theoretically) has equal access to the money.45
Or, perhaps, it is okay for the government to sponsor a religious holiday display as long
as other religions are given equal access to the public space.46 A question that might
emerge in the future is to what extent the Government has to ensure positive, as opposed
to negative, liberties. Where liberty means the right of self-definition, the question
becomes when does the government have a right – if not an obligation – to foster certain
disfavored groups or values to ensure that they can thrive?
Those with a progressive political agenda now find themselves defending
liberalism, albeit a changed liberalism, when less than a century ago they were the
greatest critics of liberalism as it was understood then. This fact is more than just a
remarkable irony. Just as the Lochner Court was vulnerable to a critique that exposed the
weaknesses in liberalism, so too are the proponents of the contemporary liberal political
philosophy grounded in the principle that the government must remain neutral as to
values in order to ensure that each person and group has a chance to thrive. The more
43
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polarized the country becomes, the more obvious the weakness: by forcing the
government to stay out of people’s private lives, the Court does not ensure valueneutrality but rather walks into hot-button political debates and finds itself endorsing one
set of values over another.

